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GARAGES

AND AUTOMOBILE SUPPLY STATIONS AS NUISANCES.

In the language of the Civilians, dominium includes, jus
possidendi, jus utendi, ins fruendi, just abutendi, jus disponendi
and jus prohibendi. When one has dominion over property his
common conception is that he has the right of possession, the
right to the use, the right to the produce, the right to abuse, and
the right to dispose of and to exclude all others from any interference with his ownership. It is conceivable that these element§
of ownership claimed by every property owner were possible
during the early stages of our civilization and development, but
as man continues to multiply, develop, and build, his society becomes more complicated than that of his forefathers, and those
who have complete dominion over property are confronted with
the problem of excluding others from interfering with their
ownership, or the problem of using his ownership as he desires.
It is the purpose of this article to consider that right, called in
the civil law, "jus prohibendi," that is, the right a property
owner has to the quiet, uninterrupted enjoyment of his property
and the power to prevent others from interfering with him in
so using and enjoying his possession.
The rights enumerated above may be classified as the inherent rights connected with ownership of property and unless
voluntarily transferred by the owner, limited by the courts, or
taken away by legislative authority, these rights exist in their
true sense when one has gained dominion over property by the
means of ownerhsip. After society has developed to the extent
that it has established great centers of population composed of
property owners, each claiming absolute dominion over his property, and clinging to his inherent rights connected with ownership, these rights soon begin to conflict and if not curtailed or
controlled by the state, that is, if the rights of ownership do not
become subservient to the common good, and if society by the
use of its courts and its legis]ative agencies fails to limit and
control the various uses 6f property so as to prevent one from
using his ownership in a manner detrimental to the rights of his
fellow citizens or to the common good of the citizenry of the
.state, the civilization of that state is reduced to a condition of
I
chaos.
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The inhabitants of a state own property for agricultural,
manufacturing, commercial, residential and recreational purposes. In addition to the above named uses, through a system of
common or state ownership, property is owned for the establishment of places of worship, for educational purposes and for
numerous other institutions common to a modern state. If ownership of property is for agricultural purposes, located far from
the congestion of a modern center of population, there is little
or no conflict between the one having dominion over the property
and his neighbor, but when one owns property in a modern city
his use is by necessity limited to that use which will not conflict with the rights of his neighbors, and as he has numerous
neighbors within a small area, his use is limited to a greater extent.than that of the agriculturist. The following illustrates a
common conflict incidental to property ownership in a congested
center of population: "A" owns a lot of ground located in the
midst of a growing city, "A's" neighbors through common
ownership erect a place of worship adjoining his property and
all the available space in this section of the city other than "A's"
lot is used for residential purposes. "A" desires to go into the
livery stable business and as his lot is located on the main highway leading into the city and as it is a comparatively short
distance to the business district he builds a livery barn on his lot.
In building this barn "A" acts upon the assumption, that having the right of the use, he may use or abuse his property as he
so desires. Soon after the erection of his stable, on account of
the natural accumulation of manure and rubbish common to such
establishments, this property becomes a breeder of flies and offensive odors. Those who desire to attend the place of worship
and those who have established homes in the vicinity of the
livery stable find that "A's" use interferes with their use, that
is, "A's" use is such as produces a tangible and appreciable injury to neighboring property and is such as renders its enjoyment physically uncomfortable and inconvenient. To institute
a tort action at law for damages would not abate the nuisance,
so the neighbors of "A" will apply to a court of equity and the
court upon fndin- the facts to be as above stated will abate the
nuisance and enjoin "A" from putting his property to a use
which interferes with the use of his neighbors. To restate the
principle, equity limits the use of "A's" propert3r to that use
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which will not encroach upon the enjoyment of his neighbors in
the use of their property and as "A's" property is located in
an exclusive residential district adjoining a place of worship,
"A's" use is limited to a use which is in keeping with the character of the neighborhood. If "A" desires to establish a livery
stable he must establish it in a section of the city where it will
not be a nuisance. This protection granted by a court of equity
is protecting the jus prohibendi of "A's" neighbors, but in the
protection granted to others it has limited the use of "A's"
dominion, and such is the effect on the property rights of those
who have ownership under our modern state.
Due to the inventive genius of man the automobile, a new
species of property, has been brought into being and as a result
of its general use a new business allied to the automobile industry
has been created, that of supplying fuel, storage, accessories and
repairs for automobile owners. The automobile industry, possibly the greatest in America, in fact one of the newest, presents
many complicated problems to modern society and the courts to
solve. Within the last decade the business of supplying the
needs of automobile owners has so multiplied and competition is
becoming so keen, that in any city, those who are using their
property for this purpose of commerce often exceed that of any
other commercial pursuit. In many instances the garage and
automobile supply stations have been established in residential
districts which have heretofore been free from the commercial
pursuits of man. During the last few years, possibly not more
than five, a new type of automobile supply station has been devised for the purpose of occupying a small lot of ground at the
intersection of two streets. These stations are used for the exclusive purpose of supplying oil and gasoline to automobile
owners. Large quantities of gasoline are stored in underground
tanks and is pumped from these tanks as sold. The rubbish often
collected around these places of business, the offensive and
noxious odors resulting from the handling of oil and gasoline,
the continuous noise resulting from starting and stopping of
automobiles and the furnishing of an attractive dangerous place
where children of tender age desire to play and congregate, make
these establishments undesirable to all who own property for
residential purposes or to those who have established churches
or schools.

~nAAGES

AND AUTOmOBILE SuPPLY STATIONS

The term nuisance as defined by the Standard Dictionary
is a term meaning, "That which annoys, vexes, or harms, or
that which by its use or existence works annoyance or damage to
another." This is the literal meaning of the term which has been
somewhat limited by judicial construction, that is, a thing constituting a nuisance according to the ordinary definition of the
term may not be considered as such when the judicial principle
defining nuisance is applied. In the judicial sense a nuisance is
an unlawful use by a person of his property in such a manner as
to cause material annoyance, discomfort, or hurt to other persons
or the public generally, and in addition to this every enjoyment
by one of his own property which violates the rights of another
in an essential degree, constitutes a nuisance.' Blackstone defines a nuisance as being, "anything done to the hurt, or annoyace of the landp, testaments or hereditaments of another."
Wfien the above namin 4'ements are present, as shown by
the illustration previously recited, equity will take jurisdiction
and abate the nuisance or limit the use of the property to such
an extent that its use will not interfere with the rights of the
neighboring .property owners. Justice Story in discussing private nuisance states that, "The interference of courts of equity
by way of injunction is undoubtedly founded upon the ground
of restraining irreparable mischief, or of suppressing oppressive
and interminable litigation, or of preventing multiplicity of
suits. It is not every case which will furnish a right of action
against a party for a nuisance, which will justify the interposition of courts of equity to redress the injury or to remove the
annoyance. But there must be such an injury, as from its nature
is not susceptible of being adequately compensated by damages
at law, or such as, from 'its continuance or permanent mischief,
must occasion a constantly recurring grievance, which cannot
be otherwise prevented but by an injunction.''2
An analysis of the cases on this subject which apply the
principles recited, show that equity will enjoin the following
uses of property when they have interfered with the use of adjoining property: ball games, barns, the keeping of bees, ringing
1
Davis v. Sawyer, 133 Mass. 289; Grady v. Wolser, 46 Ala. 381;
Pennslyvania Lead Co.'s Appeal, 96 Pa. St. 116; Albany Christian,
Church v. Wiborn, 112 Ky. 507.
2 Story's Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 925.
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of bells, the operation of billiard or pool rooms, blacksmith
shops, blast furnaces, bone or fat boiling establishments, bowling
alleys, breweries, brick making establishments, car barns, carpet
cleaning establishments, cattle pens, hog pens, stock yards, cement works, coke ovens, cotton gins, dyeing establishments, electric light plants, factories, fertilizer factories, foundries or other
metal works, garbage plants, gas works, gold or silver beating
establishments, hospitals, laundries, livery stables, marble works,
merry-go-rounds, oil tanks, planing mills, skating rinks, slaughterhouses, smelting works, steam hammers, tallow factories, tobacco drying houses and undertaking establishments. In addition to this list equity has enjoined various other occupations
and uses of property. The location of the property and the use
sought to be enjoined are the controlling influences, that is, the
use of property considered as a nuisance in one section of a city
may not be considered as such in another. The various occupations and businesses listed above are within themselves lawful,
legitimate and necessary, but due to the fact that these uses were
applied to property where such a use is considered as a nuisance,
or the use was not conducted with the proper consideration and
respect for the rights of adjoining property owners, the courts
of equity enjoined their use or restrained it to the extent that
it should not interfere with the use of neighboring property.
In accordance with the above stated principles and illustrations, courts of equity have power to compel the abatement or
restrain the continuance of an existing nuisance, or enjoin the
commission or establishment of a contemplated nuisance, where
its nature is such that it cannot be adequately compensated for
in damages and it would occasion a constant recurrence of liti3
gation.
If redress is sought because of a threatened injury to one's
property rights by the establishment of a nuisance, he must be
prepared to show that the contemplated use complained of will
establish a nuisance in fact, for a court of equity -will not interfere where the threatened nuisance is not inevitable, but only
Codigan v. Brmon, 120 Mass. 493; Bowben. v. Edison Electrio
Illuminating Co., 60 N. Y. S. 835; Coasow Mining Co. v. South Carolina,
144 U. S. 550; Dunning v. Aurora, 40 Ill. 481; Pfingst v. Senn, 94 Ky.

556.
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contingent, depending on the manner of operation, use, or other
future circumstances. 4
The operation of a garage or automobile supply station is
not considered as being per se a nuisance; nor will a court take
judicial notice that the nature of the business is such that its
establishment in a residential section will within itself constitute
a nuisance. When an action is maintained to enjoin the building of a garage or automobile supply station, those applying for.
the relief must be prepared to show that the erection of the
structure sought to be restrained will constitute a nuisance. 5
Where an injunction has been denied when. applied for to
restrain the building of a garage or automobile supply station,
the character of the neighborhood is generally the criterion upon
which the court's decision is based. In Lansing v. Perry,6 a
suit was brought to enjoin the construction and operation of a
garage. The court denied the injunction because the evidence
showed that there was a large amount of traffic and noise on the
street where the defendants planned to establish a garage, caused
by street cars, freight cars, trains and automobiles, and that this
,ection was one in which business buildings were encroaching on
residences. This case turned upon the question of fact as to the
nature of the location in question and the court finding that a
garage in this particular locality would not constitute a nuisance, the injunction was denied.
In Julian v. Golden Rule Oil Co., the court held, "that a

temporary injunction to restrain the establishment of a gasoline
filling station should not be granted where the location was practically a business district, near railroad tracks, and in the vicinity of a mill and elevator, ice plant, and shops."
In Smith, v. Wenger,s the court denied the injunction where
it appeared that the location was one which was changing from a
residental to a business district, and was already occupied to a
considerable extent by restaurants, lodging houses, clubs, and
stores.
4Dumesnil v. Dupont, 18 B. Mon. 800; Pfilingst v. Senn, 94 Ky. 556;

Thornton v. Pall, 118 II. 350; Wolcott v. Meic, 11 N. J. E. 240; Morgan
v. Binghamton, 102 N._Y. 500.
579 Okla (191 Pac. 166).
6 216 Mich. 23 (184 N. W. 473).
7112 Kan. 671 (212 Pac. 884).
S29 Pa. St. 244 (112 Atl. 236).
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In Sherman v. Levingston,9 it was held, that the establishment of a public automobile garage on the opposite side of the
street from complainant's residence, and about seventy feet
therefrom would not be enjoined, where it appeared that the
residence was a brick, slate roofed building, that the garage was
a substantial fireproof structure of brick and concrete, and it
did not appear that the defendant proposed to store gasoline in
quantities, especially where the evidence failed to establish the
alleged strictly residential character of the district.
The principle deducible from the above cases is, that equity
will not enjoin the building of a garage or gasoline filling station when the location in question is in a business district, or in
a district where business buildings are encroaching upon a residential district, to the extent that the character of the neighborhood has changed from a strictly residential section to that of a
business section.' 0
In Phillips v. Donaldson."3 it was held that an injunction
should be granted to restrain the establishment of a public
garage in a residential district in violation of a covenant in the
deed that the grantee would not establish or carry on upon the
premises granted any noxious or offensive trade or business to
the damage or annoyance of others who had purchased or who
might thereafter purchase, in the plot in question. The court in
his decision stated, "that although a public garage is not a
nuisance per se, such a garage had been determined to be a
nuisance in a residential district, and that this would be the case
whether it was in violation of a building restriction or an annoyance to the general community."
In Raymond v. Sheperd,12 the erection of a public garage
in a district devoted to residences and apartment houses was
enjoined. It was found that if the garage were erected and
operated according to the plans and specifications there would
necessarily be noise, odors, and dangers, together with congestion of traffic, and that the garage would be a nuisance, distinctly
prejudicial to the welfare, safety, and peace of persons residing
in the immediate vicinity.
9128 N. Y. S. 581.
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See Siegel v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 155 Mich. 459 (119 N. W.
645); Hanes v. Carolina Cadillac Co., 176 N. C. 350 (97 S. E. 162);
Bourgeais v. Miller,N. J. Eq., 140 AtI. 383.
"269 Pa. 244 (112 Atl. 236).
129 Pa. Dist. R. 37.
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In Chvrch of St. Luke v. McShain,13 the court held, "that
the noises, odors, and dangers which would necessarily arise if
the garage were erected and operated according to the plans
adopted for it would constitute a nuisance distinctly prejudicial
to the welfare, comfort, and safety of persons residing in the
immediate vicinity, as well as those attending religious services."
And in Hunter v. Wood,14 the maintenance of a public garage
in a residential district was held to be a nuisance.
In Lewis v. Berney,15 the construction and operation of a
public garage, filling station and repair shop in a residential
section, and in the immediate neighborhood of the homes of the
plaintiffs, and particularly within a few feet of one of them.
was enjoined. In this case the court held, "that the petition was
not demurrable, which, in addition to alleging the above
facts, contained allegations as to the invalid state of residents
near the proposed structure, and as to the noises, odors, and
smoke which would necessarily arise therefrom, and the increase
of fire risk. congestion of traffic, and menace to health which
would result."
The above considered cases establish the principle that
equity will enjoin the erection of a garage or automobile supply
station from being erected in a residential district upon the
theory, that the establishment of a garage or automobile supply
business in a residential section, due to the noise, odors, and
dangers connected with the business, is a nuisance and a menace
to the welfare, safety, and peace of the persons residing in the
district.
In the consideration of the property rights one is vested
with when he has ownership over property the illustrations and
the cases digested above establish, that equity will intervene and
protect the right a property owner has to the quiet, uninterrupted enjoyment of his property when this right has been violated by the building of a garage or automobile supply station,
or when this right is threatened by the contemplated erection
of such structure adjoining one's property. The legislative
powers in some jurisdictions have taken notice of the fact that
the establishment of such businesses is a nuisance to certain see' 29 Pa. Dist. I. 353.
"4Pa. 120 At. 781.
13
Tex. 230 S. W. 246.
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tions of a municipality and have vested municipalities with the
authority to legislate against their establishment in residential
districts. (The constitutionality of such enactments will be discussed in a later issue of the Kentucky Law Journal.)
GEORGE W. MEUTH,
Attorneij at Law.
Bowling Green, Kentucky.

